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STUDENT COMMENT
CLASS ACTIONS IN SUITS FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN
LIGHT OF BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC. V.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION
INTRODUCTION
Collateral estoppel, an element of res judicata, is the judicial doc-
trine which precludes relitigation of issues which were finally deter-
mined in a prior litigation between the same parties or those in privity
with them.' In general, for collateral estoppel to apply, the prior judg-
ment must have been mutually binding upon the parties to the subse-
quent litigation.' However, this requirement of "mutuality," clothed as
a judicial rule, has been riddled with exceptions over the years .° The
rule has been steadily eroded so that today the overwhelming trend in
both federal and state courts is to reject its rigid application.' In the
field of patent litigation, however, the requirement of mutuality per-
sisted as a limitation on the application of collateral estoppel due to the
Supreme Court decision in Triplett v. Lowell. 5 In Triplett the Court
held that a prior adjudication of patent invalidity could not be given
conclusive effect unless the requirement of mutuality was satisfied by
the party asserting the plea of collateral estoppel.° Consequently, a
patentee" could relitigate the issue of validity as long as potential in-
fringers existed who were strangers ,to the prior litigation.° Recently,
1 See, 113 J. Moore & T. Currier, Federal Practice 1111 0.405(1), 0.405(3), 0.441(1),
0.441(2) (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
2 See 1B Moore 11 0.412(1) ; F. James, Civil Procedure § 11.31 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as James].
8 See 1B Moore 1111 0.412(2)-0412(7), 0.412(9) ; Restatement of Judgments §§ 94-111
(1942); J. Moore & T. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 Tul. L.
Rev. 301, 311-29 (1961) ; Note, 35 Geo. Wash'. L. Rev. 1010, 1015-17 (1967).
4 1B Moore 1r 0.412(1), at 64 nn.2 & 10 (1971 Cum. Supp.).
5 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
8
 Id. at 644.
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudication
adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit upon the same
claims against a different defendant. While the earlier decision may by comity
he given great weight in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render
a like decree, it is not res adjudicate_ and may not be pleaded as a defense.
Id. at 642.
[T]he rules of the common law applicable to successive litigations concerning
the same subject matter, . . . [do not preclude] re-litigation of the validity of a
patent claim previously held invalid in a suit against a different defendant.
Id. at 644.
7 The term "patentee" is used hereinafter in accordance with the statutory definition:
"The word 'patentee' includes not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued
but also the successors in title to the patentee." 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1970).
8 Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1959) (Schnackenberg, J., con-
curring). Judge Schnackenberg criticized this result:
[A patentee] may litigate and relitigate again and again the question of validity
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the Supreme Court, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation,° modified the ruling in Triplett. Blonder held
that a defendant in an infringement suit may plead collateral estoppel
against a plaintiff-patentee without satisfying the requirement of mu-
tuality when there has been a prior adjudication of patent invalidity"
in which the plaintiff-patentee was afforded a full and fair opportunity
to present his claim."
This comment will consider the procedural policies associated with
the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel and the rule of mutuality.
The special federal policies underlying the Court's decision to overrule
Triplett will also be analyzed. Special consideration will be given to the
degree to which Blonder relied upon the , aforementioned procedural
policies. The comment will then focus on the impact of Blonder upon
the desirability of the class action procedure" to a plaintiff-patentee.
Discussion will then center upon the benefits which may be derived
from increased use of the class action in suits for patent infringement.
Thus, the proper perspective will be provided for determining whether
the policies supporting use of the class action procedure reinforce the
policies underlying abrogation of the Triplett rule. Finally, the rudi-
ments of the class action procedure will be scrutinized in light of three
recent class suits for patent infringement and the procedural conse-
quences of Blonder.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT
Collateral estoppel is an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, the
judicial rule which makes a final judgment conclusive on the parties to
a suit and those in privity" with them as to all matters of fact and law
which were or should have been adjudicated , between them.' The
of his patent as long as he selects a different defendant in each of the infringe-
ment suits . . . It is a situation which is particularly abhorrent when con-
sidered against the backlog of untried cases which clogs our federal courts.
Id. at 951.
0
 402 U.S. 313 (1971).10 Id. at .350.
11
 Id. at 333.
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 governs the procedure of class actions.
18
 The doctrine of privity extends the conclusive effect of a judgment to persons who
were not parties to the earlier action. 113 Moore If 0.411(1), at 1252. The doctrine of
privity is closely related to that of mutuality. See note 20 infra.
14 1B Moore If 0.405(1), at 624. "Res judicata" is a broad term covering all the
ways in which a judgment in one action can have a binding effect in another. It includes
the effect of the prior judgment as a "bar" or "merger" where the subsequent action is
based upon all or part of the claim which supported the prior action. The term also
covers the effect of the prior judgment as "collateral estoppel" in a subsequent action
based upon a different claim.
The term "merger" describes the effect of a.judgment in plaintiff's favor extinguishing
the entire claim supporting the prior action and merging it in the judgment. The term
"bar" describes the effect of the judgment in defendant's favor, extinguishing the entire
claim upon which the prior judgment was based. See James 11.9. The-term "collateral
estoppel" refers to the more limited effect of a prior judgment when the subsequent
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purpose of the res judicata doctrine is to foster judicial economy and
certainty in legal relations" by precluding relitigation of claims that
have been finally determined." In contrast, the essence of collateral
estoppel is that an issue, finally determined in a prior suit between the
same parties or their privies, may not be relitigated in a suit based upon
a different cause of action." Hence, collateral estoppel is distinguishable
from res judicata in two respects: the cause of action in the subsequent
proceeding may differ from that in the prior suit, yet estoppel may ap-
ply; and the estoppel extends only to issues actually decided. Thus, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is broader than that of res judicata to the
extent that collateral estoppel applies to subsequent proceedings based
on a different cause of action, but narrower to the extent that collateral
estoppel does not reach issues not actually adjudicated."
As a general rule, only a person who would be bound by an un-
favorable judgment in a prior suit could be entitled to the benefits of a
favorable judgment in that suit1° This "mutuality" of rights and ob-
ligations under the judgment, 2° although originally a rule of thumb, 
action is based upon a different claim. Id. § 11.18. As used hereafter, the term "res
judicata" refers only to the "bar" and "merger" effects of a judgment as distinguished
from "collateral estoppel."
15 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
10 Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 27, 28 (1964).
17 See 113 Moore § 0.441(1). Res judicata does not apply unless the subsequent
proceeding involves the same cause of action as the prior adjudication. Collateral estoppel
applies despite the fact that the causes of action differ, but does not completely bar the
subsequent suit unless the issues estopped from being raised are, as a practical matter,
determinative of the entire controversy. 1B Moore 11 0.441(2), at 3779. In suits for
patent infringement, invalidity of the patent is a complete defense. 35 U.S.C. § 282(2)
(1970). Therefore a prior adjudication of invalidity which is given conclusive effect via
collateral estoppel completely bars a. subsequent suit for infringement of the patent.
18 113 Moore 1( 0.401, at 16-17.
10 See James § 11.31.
20 Id. "Mutuality" and "privity" are distinct but related concepts. In general,
"privity" extends the conclusive effect of the prior adjudication to persons related in
interest to a party to the prior suit but who are not parties themselves. 113 Moore
11 0.411(1), at 1252. The person seeking to invoke collateral estoppel is permitted to do so
despite the fact that he would not have been bound by the prior adjudication; that is,
despite the fact that "mutuality" is not otherwise satisfied between himself and the
person against whom the estoppel is invoked. This result is justified on the ground that
he is in privity with a person who does satisfy the mutuality requirement and who
would he entitled to plead collateral estoppel. Id.
"Mutuality" may be defined in terms of privity. Thus parties or privies in the prior
adjudication may automatically satisfy the requirement of mutuality. The same parties
who may avail themselves of the collateral estoppel effect of an adjudication under the
above definition of privity may do so under this definition of mutuality.
However, mutuality may also be defined more narrowly. Under the narrower
definition, only those who would have been bound by an adverse adjudication in the
prior suit may invoke the collateral estoppel effect of a favorable adjudication. Thus,
where a privy would not have been bound by an adverse adjudication under the broader
definitions of privity and mutuality, he could nevertheless avail himself of the collateral
estoppel effect of a favorable adjudication, whereas under the narrowed definition he
could not. 1B Moore 11 0.411(1), at 1251, 1B Moore If 0.412(1), at 1801 & n.1. The
problem is more conjectural than real, however, since normally one who is in privity
would have been bound by the first judgment. 1B Moore 11 0.412(1) at 1801 & n.1.
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evolved into an "independent principle of justice."' If the mutuality
rule were not satisfied the plea of collateral estoppel would be fore-
closed and the prior determination would not be given preclusive effect.
However, the judgment would not be deprived of all effect, for even if
collateral estoppel were inapplicable a subsequent court might, after-
studying the soundness of the prior adjudication, be persuaded to adopt
that adjudication as a matter of comity. 22
Triplett v. Lowell preserved the rule of mutuality in suits for pat-
ent infringement. The Supreme Court there held that the requirement
of mutuality must be satisfied by an alleged infringer before an adjudi-
cation of patent invalidity could estop a patentee from relitigating the
issue of validity in a subsequent suit." If the prior adjudication of
invalidity cannot be given preclusive effect upon motion for summary
judgment,' then the defendant must rely on comity to overcome the
statutory presumption of patent validity as well as any evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiff-patentee in support of his claim." Due to the
technical nature of the issue of validity, it is possible that the pertinent
facts will not be established with sufficient clarity to justify summary
21 James
	
11.31.
22
 Comity is defined as: "The principle in accordance with which the courts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as
a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." Black's Law Dictionary 334
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Comity is a variant of stare decisis, the doctrine which requires a court to adhere to
the rules of law formed in its preceding decisions or by a court to which it owes
obedience. 1B Moore If 0.402(1), at 60-61. Where there is no duty of obedience the subse-
quent court is not bound to follow the prior decision but may nevertheless find the
decision persuasive by comity to the extent of its underlying reasoning. Id. at 61.
Comity is independent of the doctrine of res judicata since the prior decision is ac-
cepted as controlling, not because of the relationship of the parties, but because the
reasoning which supports the prior decision applies to the facts in the subsequent
proceeding. 1B Moore Mr 0.401, 0.402(1), at 56-57.
In general, comity is a principle of jurisprudence which should be followed where it
promotes substantial justice. Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare DecIsis and
Law of the Case, 21 Texas L. Rev. 51.4, 552 (1943).
23 297 U.S. at 644. See note 6 supra.
24 Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense which must be properly brought to
the court's attention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). See 1B Moore 11 0.408(1). It is possible to
raise the plea by motion for summary judgment prior or subsequent to answer if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 1B Moore ¶ 0.408(1), at 953; 6 Moore
ff 56.02(2), at 2033-34, 11.56.08, at 2106. In this respect, note that motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted or for judgment on the pleadings
may be treated as motions for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. I2(b), 12(c). The
party invoking the estoppel bears the burden of •proving that the precise question was
actually decided in:the prior action. 1B Moore 0.408(1),•at 954.
25 6 Moore 11 56.11(10), at 2209, ¶ 56.17(44); at 2614. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970)
provides: "A patent shall be presumed valid . . . The burden of establishing invalidity
of a patent ... shall rest on the party asserting it." However, the statutory presumption ,
has frequently been disregarded or distinguished in resolving the issue of validity. See,
e.g., Udin v. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 716, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
Lemelson v. Topper Corp., 171 U.S.P.Q. 705 (2d Cir. 1971), Hall v. U.S. Fiber Plastics
Corp., 172.U.S.P.Q. 556, 562 (D.N.J. 1971). -
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judgment for the defendant. 2° Consequently, the issue must be reli ti-
gated with the expense and delay characteristic of suits for patent in-
fringement."
Triplett had wide ranging effects. If collateral estoppel were inap-
plicable due to lack of mutuality, the patentee could harass strangers to
the adjudication of invalidity and coerce alleged infringers to enter
licensing agreements or force them to bear the expense of a full-scale
tria1.28 Since an initial adjudication of invalidity did not mean that the
patent was invalid as to all defendants, considerable uncertainty was
introduced into legal relations premised upon use of the patentee's
invention. In contrast, giving the prior judgment of invalidity preclu-
sive effect regardless of the absence of mutuality offers a way to promote
judicial economy, prevent harassment, and introduce certainty into
legal relations. However, despite the undesirable consequences of the
mutuality requirement, and although the requirement was gradually
whittled away by state and federal courts in non-patent litigation, 2° the
28
 6 Moore ¶ 56.17(44), at 2617. Certainly, the courts have been less than enthu-
siastic in entertaining motions for summary judgment where the validity of the patent
is in issue:
[I]n order to determine patent validity upon that motion [for summary judg-
ment], "... the court must be certain that it does not need any expert testimony
or other extrinsic evidence to explain or evaluate the prior art ... , invalidity
for lack of invention being so clearly apparent on the face of the patent that
no testimony could change that conclusion."
Messing v. Quiltmaster Corp., 159 F. Supp. 181, 184 (D.N.J. 1958). But see Ken Wire
& Metal Products, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 632
(S.D.N.Y, 1971) (summary judgment held appropriate where patented device is simple
and easily understood.)
ar See Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System (1966); one of
the most common grievances called to the Commission's attention, by all branches of the
patent-using community, has been the high cost of patent litigation. Id. at 39. See also
402 U.S. at 335-38 nn.27-33.
28 The courts felt constrained to allow a full-scale trial despite the prior adjudica-
tion of invalidity. See, e.g., Blumcraft v. Kawneer Co., 318 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
20 The landmark case decided by the California Supreme Court which abrogated the
strict requirement of mutuality and replaced it with a theory of unilateral estoppel was
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942). See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 25 (1965).
The Bernhard decision was described as "a powerful instrument for the expeditious and
economic handling of massive litigation. . ." Id. at 36. The decision openly repudiated
the doctrine of mutuality:
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of
mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should
be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound
by it is difficult to comprehend.
19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
In lieu of the mutuality requirement the court proposed a doctrine of unilateral estoppel:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are
pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?
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pronouncement in Triplett proved to be a sufficient restraining force to
keep the rule intact with respect to suits for patent infringement." In
Blonder, the Supreme Court had to reconcile the Triplett rule with the
criticism of an army of courts and commentators who had gathered in
opposition to a strict requirement of mutuality."
II. THE DECISION IN Blonder
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, the Supreme Court modified its holding in Triplett to per-
mit an alleged infringer to plead collateral estoppel when there has been
a prior adjudication of patent invalidity in which the patentee had been
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim." Ironically, the
case reached the Supreme Court due to conflicting adjudications of the
issue of validity by the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The Foundation" had filed suit for patent infringement against the
Winegard Company in the District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa84
 Winegard alleged invalidity of the patent as a defense." Prior
to decision in the Winegard litigation, the Foundation filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois against Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc.," for infringement of the Isbell patent and another patent not here
material." Blonder-Tongue asserted invalidity of both patents as a
19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. On the other 'hand, Professor Moore has argued
vigorously for retention of the mutuality rule. See 1B Moore 11 0.421(1), at 1809-1812.
no E.g., Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1969); Blumcraft v. Kavmeer,
318 F. Supp. 1399 (ND. Ga. 1970).
81 See, cases and commentary cited in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 318 n.5, 323 n.10 (1971). See also Report of the President's
Comm'n on the Patent System at 39.
82 402 U.S. at 350.
83 The Foundation was assignee of U.S. Pat. No. 3,210,767 issued on Oct. 5, 1965 to
Dwight Isbell [hereinafter referred to as the Isbell patent]. 402 U.S. at 314.
84
 University of Ill, Found. v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967),
aff'd, 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
85
 The defense was grounded upon the allegations that the invention was disclosed
more than one year prior to the date of application for the patent and that, at the time
made, the invention was obvious to one skilled in the art. 271 F. Supp. at 413. The
former allegation is based upon 35 U.S.C. $ 102 (1970).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . .
The latter allegation is based upon 35 U.S.C. 1 103 (1970):
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
88 University of III. Found. v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., Civ. No. 66C567 (N.D.
Ill. 1966) (unreported decision), aff'd., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970), vacated and re-
manded, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
81 The Foundation was also assignee of U.S. Pat. No. Re. 25,740, issued March 9,
1965, to P. E. Mayes.
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defense." Subsequent to the filing of the complaint in Blonder, but prior
to decision, the Iowa district court decided Winegard in favor of the
defendant, holding the Isbell patent invalid as entailing a combination
of known elements which would have been obvious to one ordinarily
skilled in the art." The judgment of invalidity was affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit." Nevertheless, the Illinois district court, relying on the
rule of Triplett, held itself "free to decide the case at bar on the basis
of evidence before it," and proceeded to find the patent valid and in-
fringed." The Seventh Circuit affirmed" and Blonder-Tongue sought
certiorari primarily because of the conflicting decisions of the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits." Certiorari was granted but was not limited to
the issue of patent validity." The Court requested the parties to present
arguments on two issues not raised in the petition for certiorari: first,
whether the holding in Triplett should be adhered to, and secondly,
whether the prior determination of invalidity in the Winegard case
should bind the Foundation in subsequent suits brought for infringe-
ment of the Isbell patent."
In considering whether to modify the strict mutuality requirement
of Triplett, the Court pursued three lines of inquiry. First, assuming a
special public interest in maintaining only valid patents, was the Trip-
lett rule an "essential safeguard" against improvident decisions of in-
validity? Secondly, did the economic consequences corresponding to
further adherence to Triplett require modification of the rule? Thirdly,
did Triplett impose an objectionable burden on efficient judicial admin-
istration of suits brought for patent infringement?"
With respect to the initial inquiry, the Court indicated that the
Triplett rule was not an essential, or even effective, safeguard against
unsound adjudications of invalidity s7 Conceding the difficulties of deci-
sion due to the complexity of issues peculiar to patent litigation, the
Court was of the opinion that a subsequent adjudication would not
necessarily result in a more accurate determination than the initial
88
 422 F.2d at 770.
80
 271 F. Supp. at 419.
40 402 F.2d 125 (1968).
41 402 U.S. at 316, quoting from unreported District Court opinion.
48
 422 F.2d 769, 778. The court noted that sound judicial policy would dictate that
the prior adjudication of invalidity against the Foundation be given conclusive effect
in subsequent actions for infringement brought by the Foundation but that such was
"not the law in this field." Id. at 772.
48 402 U.S. at 317.
44 400 U.S. 864 (1970) ; 402 U.S. at 317 n.4.
48 402 U.S. at 317. After reviewing the decisions and commentary critical of the
mutuality rule, the Court stated:
[T]hese [departures from the mutuality rule] are not before us for wholesale
approval or rejection. But at the very least they counsel us to re-examine whether
mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate the
validity of a patent once a federal court has declared it to be invalid.
Id. at 329.
48 Id. at 330.
47 Id. at 334.
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decision." Furthermore, not all issues concerning patent validity are so
complex as to provoke a frank admission of judicial uncertainty, some
issues being of a technical nature but susceptible of development on a
case-by-case basis, and some issues being of an entirely non-technical
nature presenting no more difficulty than issues ordinarily presented to
the courts in non-patent cases." Additionally, the Court emphasized
that the patentee possesses the initiative in bringing the infringement
suit, selecting the time, forum and defendant." Consequently, the Court
presumed that the patentee would be prepared to litigate the first suit
to the finish.' Finally, the Court stated that should the highly complex
nature of the issues in a patent suit result in an improvident determina-
tion of invalidity, such adjudications will not be given undue effect by
way of collateral estoppel, because the patentee must have had "a fair
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his
claim the first time" before the plea of estoppel will be permitted."
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Triplett rule did not
preclude unsound adjudications of invalidity or further the purposes of
the patent system. 58
The second line of inquiry was of considerably greater concern to
the Court and concerned the economic consequences of further adher-
ence to the Triplett rule. In light of the great expense of litigating a suit
for patent infringement, expenditures by the parties in relitigating an
issue properly decided in a prior suit are an offensive misallocation of
48 Id. at 331-32.
45 Id. at 332.
so Id. Moreover, due to the liberal rules for discovery under the Federal Rules the
patentee should be able to present all the relevant and probative evidence before the
court in the initial litigation without facing surprise in the form of evidence presented
by the defendant.
Although an alleged infringer may bring suit against the patentee for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity, the Court carefully limited itself to consideration of the
procedural setting in which the patentee had been plaintiff in the first suit. Where the
initiative has been seized by the alleged infringer there are strong reasons for retaining
the mutuality rule. Cf. 1B Moore J 0.412(1), at 1809-12.
51 402 U.S. at 332.
o2 Id. at 333, quoting from Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301
(D. Mass. 1960). Whether the patentee has been afforded a full and fair opportunity
to contest his claim depends upon the circumstances of the particular case: "In the end,
decision will necessarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity." 402 U.S. at
334. For a list of factors considered by the courts in determining whether to allow the
plea of estoppel, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1052-59 (1970).
55 402 U.S. at 334. Although the Triplett rule does not ensure judicial certainty in
determining the validity of a patent, it does serve the public interest to the extent that
it makes it difficult to undermine the patent grant. Strengthening the patent grant
fosters the incentive required to promote technological progress. On the other hand,
the public interest in weeding out specious patents is served by a policy which
facilitates challenges to the validity of the patent. See n.57 infra. Triplett obstructs this
purpose where the prior litigation has resulted in a proper determination of invalidity,
since the Triplett rule strengthens the unwarranted "monopoly" against attacks by
strangers to the first suit. The rule withholds from the public the benefits of a con-
clusive determination of invalidity and, in fact, encourages judicial assault on sound
adjudications of invalidity.
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resources." Even more significant to the Court than the economic con-
sequences to the parties were the undesirable economic effects on a
competitive economy. Adherence to Triplett enables the holder of a
patent which has already been adjudicated invalid to exact licensing
agreements and settlements from prospective defendants who prefer not
to undertake the costly burden of challenging the patent." The prospec-
tive defendant who is forced to accept a license is put at a disadvantage
in relation to competitors who resist the patentee's pressures because
these competitors can afford to litigate, or have successfully litigated,
the issue of validity. As a result, such a prospective defendant may be
forced to absorb the licensing costs in order to remain competitively
priced, and so be even less likely to challenge the validity of the
patent." Consequently, the unrestricted right to relitigate the issue of
invalidity actually frustrates the federal policy which facilitates chal-
lenges to patent validity."
On the other hand, the manufacturer who can afford to litigate the
issue of validity may resist the patentee and set his price levels above
those ordinarily maintainable in a competitive market but just below
the levels of those financially weaker manufacturers forced into licens-
ing agreements or settlements with the patentee." Should the manufac-
turer paying the royalty or settlement costs pass them on to the con-
sumer in the form of higher prices, an overall price increase of the
goods covered by the invalid patent results, which increase must be
borne by the ultimate consumer. Although such "tribute" is acceptable
in the case of a valid patent, due to the balancing effect of the benefits
received by the public from the patentee's public disclosure of his
discovery, there is no justification for the increased price in the case
54
 402 U.S. at 338. This misallocation of resources results in diversion of funds,
which otherwise would be devoted to research and development, to needless litigation.
Thus the constitutional purpose of the patent system, to promote the progress of the
useful arts (U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8), is inhibited. Comity makes the ultimate decision
predictable and assures uniformity of decision, but it does not preclude the wasteful
misallocation of resources since comity may not avert extended litigation.
55 402 U.S. at 338-42. See Report of the President's Comm'n on the Patent System,
which states:
[T]he high cost of patent litigation results in good and valid patents being
defied and going unenforced, invalid patents being kept from court scrutiny,
and, finally, compromises, settlements and licensing arrangements, whose only
justification is an economic one, i.e., the avoidance of enormous litigation
expense.
Id. at 40.
58 402 U.S. at 346. Although the licensee may comply with the terms of the license
until he is financially able to challenge the patent, the royalties received during the term
of obedience may be an unjustifiable tribute to the patentee. Id.
57
 For the leading exposition of this policy, see Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 658
(1969).
88
 402 U.S. at 346. In this manner the manufacturer can Increase his share in the
market independently of the price levels that would otherwise prevail in a competitive
market—a result hardly consistent with the policy of free competition embodied in the
antitrust laws. Id.
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of an invalid patent, since the public derives no benefit from a "dis-
closure" of what was already known or old in an art.
Another economic danger from adherence to Triplett arises from
the patentee's use of the invalid patent to exclude the entry of potential
competitors into the market." Such use of invalid patents obstructs the
public policy of free competition and, to the extent that entering firms
could eventually challenge the validity of the patent, frustrates the
federal policy facilitating challenges to patent validity. Thus, the
economic consequences of further adherence to Triplett were pernicious
to both the federal policy which seeks to eliminate specious patents and
to the public policy favoring free competition."
While the Court regarded the ineffectiveness of the Triplett rule
in serving the goals of the patent system and the deleterious economic
consequences of that rule as the dominant factors favoring modification
of the mutuality requirement, it also considered, as a third inquiry, the
effect that abrogation of the Triplett rule would have upon judicial
administration." Although it was argued that suits for patent infringe-
ment based upon patents which have once been adjudicated invalid
present a de minimus burden on the courts, the Court noted that the
typical patent suit is of disproportionate length and that accordingly,
modification of Triplett would be administratively beneficial if even
a few relatively lengthy patent suits could be disposed of by way of
estoppel." Regardless of the arguably de minimus effects of Triplett
upon judicial economy, the deleterious economic consequences remain
and are themselves sufficient to justify the decision.
For these reasons the Blonder Court partially overruled Triplett,
allowing an alleged infringer to plead collateral estoppel based on a
prior adjudication of invalidity against a patentee who had been a
plaintiff in the prior suit.
59 Id. at 346-47. Part of the "cost" to the prospective entrant will take the form
of license or royalty payments.
69 Id. at 347. "Economic consequences like these, to the extent that they can be
avoided, weigh in favor of modification of the Triplett mutuality principle." Id.
In non-patent litigation the advantages to judicial economy resulting from
abrogation of mutuality were the primary reasons for the demise of the rule. 113 Moore
If 0.412(1), at 1607-09. But in the field of patent litigation the burden on the federal
dockets comprised only a secondary consideration:
Regardless of the magnitude of the figures, the economic consequences of con-
tinued adherence to Triplett are serious and any reduction of litigation in this
context is by comparison an incidental matter in considering whether to abrogate
the mutuality requirement.
402 U.S. at 349.
62 402 U.S. at 348. See also statistics summarizing the workload on the federal
courts as a result of patent litigation during the years 1968 -70. Id. at 336-38 nn.29 -33.
To the extent that the holder of an invalid patent will refrain from bringing suit
against certain defendants in light of the final effect of an adjudication of invalidity,
Blonder does ameliorate the administrative burden on the courts. This effect is greater
than that of the disposition of a suit by summary judgment based on collateral estoppel
where there has already been an adjudication of invalidity.
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III. THE IMPACT OF Blonder ON CLASS ACTIONS
UNDER FEDERAL RULE 23
The procedural consequences of the Blonder decision are signifi-
cant in light of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since
the first adjudication of invalidity may now be given preclusive effect
against the patentee as to all prospective infringers, while individual
adjudications of validity bind only the parties to the suit and their
privies, it may be advisable for the patentee to bring the infringement
suit as a class action.
Before Blonder, under the Triplett rule, patentees had found it
advantageous to bring suits for patent infringement individually rather
than as class actions. If the patentee received an adjudication of in-
validity in an individual suit, he could rely on Triplett to relitigate the
issue of validity against strangers to that suit. While the defendant
retained only the hope that the court might adopt the prior adjudication
on grounds of comity, the patentee enjoyed the benefits of the statutory
presumption of validity and the reluctance of the courts to grant sum-
mary judgment. Thus, the patentee who brought an individual suit
risked only the chance that the reasoning behind an unfavorable deci-
sion in that suit might persuade a second court to adopt the earlier
decision on grounds of comity. It was not improbable that the patentee
could successfully relitigate the issue, particularly if the defendant
lacked the financial resources to pursue the defense zealously.
On the other hand, if the patentee had brought a class action
suit against all alleged infringers, his risk would have been much more
severe because an adjudication of invalidity would have been res
judicata with respect to the entire class of defendants." Thus, as a
practical matter, the patentee would have been foreclosed from reliti-
gating the issue of validity. 64 The foreclosure effect of an adjudication
of invalidity in a class action was extreme when compared to the effect
of such a judgment in an individual suit. Of course, to the patentee's
advantage, an adjudication of validity in a class action infringement
suit would have been res judicata against the entire class of defen-
dants. Nevertheless, the patentee who was financially able to litigate
either by separate suits or by class action would have been influenced
to choose the series of separate suits, despite the advantages of an
adjudication of validity in a class action, because the adverse effects
of an adjudication of invalidity in an individual suit were relatively
limited.
Under Blonder, the first adjudication of invalidity may preclude
relitigation of the issue of validity. The adjudication may bind the
patentee by way of collateral estoppel even if the alleged infringer is a
stranger to the first suit. Thus, an adjudication of invalidity in an
na See 3B Moore 23.60 at 23-1202.
84 However, the patentee could have relitigated against alleged infringers who were
not members of the class.
1483
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
individual suit has virtually the same effect as an adjudication of
invalidity in a class action. The patentee, then, risks no more by an
unfavorable adjudication in the class action than he does by an -unfavor-
able adjudication in the individual suit.
On the other hand, adjudications of validity in individual suits
have no greater effect in subsequent suits than they had before Blonder.
The effect of adjudications of validity remains limited to that received
by way of comity. Regardless of the number of prior adjudications of
validity, the prospective defendant cannot be denied his day in court.
Therefore, the patentee must relitigate the issue of validity in each
successive suit. In contrast, a judgment of validity in a class action,
because of its res judicata effect, relieves the patentee of the burden ,
of relitigating the issue against all class members.
There are additional disadvantages to pursuing the "string of vic-
tories" approach, independent of the preclusive effect given adjudica-
tions of invalidity due to collateral estoppel. In the event of a single
adjudication of invalidity, relief from the prospective effect of a
string of prior adjudications of validity may be granted all defen-
dants otherwise bound by those prior adjudications. Thus prior adju-
dications of validity may not be given res judicata effect and
corresponding injunctions may not be enforced, Further, a writ of
execution based upon the prior judgment may be denied the plaintiff-
patentee." These results are justified on the two primary grounds which
support the Blonder decision. First, given the subsequent judgment
of invalidity, if the patentee is permitted to restrain the defendant
from using his invention, the free use of an idea belonging in the public
domain is restricted. Certainly, federal policy dictates that this last
vestige of immunity be stripped from the invalid patent. Secondly, to
continue to subject the defendant to the prior judgment of validity
05
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a trial judgment, order or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (5) . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment ... .
It has been said that Rule 60(b) (5) applies only to judgments with prospective
effect. Thus, the rule might not apply to a judgment for money damages. Ryan v.
United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434' (2d Cir. 1962). However, the point is at
least arguable. Practically speaking, an unsatisfied judgment for money damages is of
prospective application. Thus, relief under Rule 60(b)(5) may be justified. Bros. Inc.
v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 610 (5th Cir. 1963).
Relief from a prior judgment should be granted under Rule 60(b)(6) when
appropriate to achieve an equitable result. L.M. Leathers' Sons v. Goldman, 252 F.2d
188, 190 (6th Cir. 1958). Thus, there is a fundamental conflict between the strong public
policy of finality of judgments and the policy to do substantial justice. Another
significant factor is the public interest in the governmentally bestowed patent monopoly.
320 F.2d at 600, 609-610. In light of. the rationale underlying the Blonder decision, it is
probable that the courts will find the equities to weigh in favor of the defendant to the
prior suit. Cf. 320 F.2d at 611.
60 Cf. 7 Moore ji 69.03(3) at 2412.
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would permit the patentee to extract license payments from the defen-
dant based on an invalid patent, since the defendant would be prevented
by res judicata from contesting the validity of the patent in any suit
brought by the patentee to enforce his judgment or recover royalty pay-
ments. This imposes an appreciable competitive disadvantage upon the
licensee and, as the Court indicated in Blonder, is an unjustified incur-
sion into the zone of free competition. Thus, based upon the rationale
of the Blonder decision, an adjudication of invalidity should deprive the
patentee of the anticipatory benefits of prior adjudications of validity."
07 An interesting question is presented when the plaintiff-patentee and the defendant
(who has lost the infringement suit) have negotiated a licensing agreement based on an
adjudication of validity. If the prior adjudication of validity is followed by a deter-
mination of invalidity in a different suit, should the patentee be required to restore
WI payments made by the defendant under the prior agreement? At least one court has
held that the patentee is so bound. See Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., — F.
Supp. _, 172 U.S.P.Q. 292 (W.D• Ky. 1971). The district court relied on the holding
in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), which permitted a licensee to avoid all royalty
payments from the date of issuance of the patent if he could prove invalidity. Id. at
671-74. Lear speaks of a licensee being able to avoid all royalties paid subsequent to the
issuance of the patent. Id. at 674. However, Lear and Troxel are distinguishable on their
facts. In Lear, the patentee negotiated a licensing agreement with the defendant which
was terminated before the patent issued. In Troxel, the license was not terminated until
after an adjudication of invalidity in a suit to which Troxel was not a party. — F.
Supp. —, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 293.
In Lear, permitting the licensee to avoid all payments due after the date of
issuance of the patent (if he could prove invalidity of the patent) was justified on the
ground that the licensee would be free from financial restraint. Thus the licensee could
ably attack the patent. This result is consistent with the federal policy of weeding out
specious patents. However, in Troxel the licensing agreement was entered into after the
patent had issued. It is consonant with the rationale of Lear to permit the licensee to
avoid only those payments following termination of the agreement (upon proof of
invalidity). This alleviates the financial burden upon the licensee, facilitating the
challenge to patent validity according to Lear. However, the licensee should not be
permitted to recover payments received by the patentee before termination of the
agreement. Such recovery does not facilitate challenges to patent validity. On the other
hand, it does introduce considerable uncertainty into industrial relations, effectively
undermining the use of licensing agreements. The ultimate effect would be to deter rather
than promote technological progress, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate
of Article 1, section 8. Such an absurd result cannot be justified by blind adherence to
the language, but not the spirit, of Lear.
Thus, it is consonant with both ,Lear and Blonder that the patentee should be
denied all royalties due following termination of the licensing agreement, white he
should be permitted to retain those royalties already received.
Whether or not the federal courts follow Trout, it is clear that the effect of an
adjudication of invalidity after Blonder may be to "reach back" to erase preceding
adjudications of validity. Thus the patentee may be left with interim injunctive relief, any
executed monetary judgment, and a portion of the royalty payments specified in a
licensing agreement.
Under Rule 60(b) (5), relief may be afforded from the prospective effect of a prior
judgment but may not affect the monetary damages awarded. Since no such limitation
is imposed on Rule 60(b) (6), relief from an unexecuted judgment for monetary damages
is possible. See discussion, note 65 supra. See also 7 Moore 1111 60.26(4) at 338 n.41, and
60-527(1), 60.27(2).
The expense and delay of multiple litigation under the "string of victories" ap-
proach should be weighed against these potential consequences.
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Consequently, by upsetting the balance of risks to the patentee,
the decision in Blonder will affect the procedural context in which most
suits for patent infringement are brought. It may now be to the paten-
tee's advantage to bring a suit for patent infringement as a class action.
The effect of an adverse adjudication of the issue of validity is no
greater in the class action than in an individual infringement suit while
the effect of a favorable adjudication is decidedly broader in the class
action.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
UPON THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE Blonder DECISION
Although the holding in Blonder has significant impact upon the
role of the class action in suits for patent infringement, the class action
in turn promotes the three policies which motivated the Court to modify
Triplett: class actions lessen the danger of improvident adjudications
of invalidity, further eliminate the harmful economic consequences
which spring from adherence to the Trip/6U rule, and alleviate con-
siderably the administrative burden on the federal courts.
In Blonder, the Court was of the opinion that the rule in Triplett
did not effectively serve as a safeguard against improvident adjudica-
tions of invalidity and, to that extent, did not foster the purposes of the
patent system." In contrast, the class action may lessen the probability
of improvident adjudications of invalidity because the representative
defendants must be capable of vigorously litigating the issue of validity
to the court's satisfaction." Further, the class action may serve to sim-
plify the complex procedural issues facing the court." The court will
be given a better opportunity to decide properly the issue of validity if
the adversaries are more equally matched and able to present the best
arguments and evidence to the court. Thus, the class action promotes
the first policy underlying the Blonder decision, i.e., to assure against
improvident adjudications of invalidity, a result not achieved by the
Triplett rule.
The Blonder decision was based primarily on the adverse economic
consequences of coercive agreements made possible by the Triplett
rule.". In a class suit, however, those parties approved by the court to
represent the class will be financially able to litigate the issues to the
finish. It is unlikely that the patentee will be able to force the repre-
OB
	 p. 1479 supra.
eg See p. 1492 infra.
70
 See Judicial Conference of U.S., Coordinating Comm. for Multiple Litigation,
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict litigation at 69 (1970) (hereinafter cited as
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation]. The class suit may be maintained
with respect to particular issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4). Separate trial of the issues
of patent validity, infringement, misuse and violation of the anti-trust laws may be
desirable. Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation 5S-56. Thus, an adjudication
of patent invalidity makes determination of the issue of infringement unnecessary, thereby
eliminating procedural complexities inherent in litigation of the latter issue.
71 See p. 1480 supra.
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sentative parties into licensing agreements or settlements on behalf of
the class because the court must approve any proposed compromise."
Additionally, since a defendant need not bear the entire cost of chal-
lenging the patent, an alleged infringer whose financial resources are
limited can afford to enter the litigation as a nonrepresentative member
of the class rather than pay tribute to the patentee. Thus, through in-
creased use of the class action, the economic policies underlying Blonder
will be reinforced because a patentee cannot financially pressure alleged
infringers, who are class members, into settlements or licensing agree-
ments.
Increased use of the class action may be limited by recalcitrant
patentees. If a patentee has not yet received an adjudication of invalid-
ity collateral estoppel may not be applied against him. Therefore, he
may persist in bringing separate suits for infringement in order to blud-
geon licensing agreements or settlements from weak defendants. Thus,
the economic consequences found objectionable in Blonder may persist
despite modification of Triplett." However, in contrast to the apparent
inadequacy of Blonder in this situation, the class action may be utilized
to ensure a full and fair adjudication of the issue of validity without the
specter of coercion. For this reason, if numerous suits are pending, they
should be transferred, consolidated,'" and converted into a class action
on motion by a defendant or by the court sua sponte." The same eco-
nomic consequences which influenced the Court to abrogate the require-
ment of mutuality in _Blonder justify conversion of the suit sua sponte
into a class action. Thus the financially weak defendant can be immu-
nized from financial pressure by the patentee despite the fact that the
ruling in Blonder does not apply.
Finally, Blonder indicated that judicial economy resulting from
abrogation of the requirement of mutuality was a secondary, although
not an insignificant, factor justifying modification of Triplett." How-
ever, in the light of the predicted effect of .Blonder on the utilization of
class actions, the ultimate effect upon judicial administration may be
more pronounced than the Court acknowledged. The Blonder Court
recognized the benefits of disposing of even a small number of relatively
72 See p. 1501 infra.
78 After Blonder, the patentee will scrutinize the forums and defendants that are
available more carefully, preferring a forum which has a statistical history of dealing
favorably with patentees with regard to the issue of validity. The patentee will seek a
defendant who is financially unable to pursue the defense zealously. In this manner, the
patentee may hope to avoid an initial adjudication of invalidity.
74 Transfer and consolidation of pending related suits in multiple and multi-district
litigation, under 28 U.S.C. *1 1404, 1408, is discussed in detail in Manual for Complex
and Multidistrict Litigation at 62-71.
75 Id. at 14. "A civil action may be brought as or converted into a class action by
the parties under amended Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., or the court may sun sponte initiate
the conversion of an action into a class action." Id. See 3B Moore II 23.02-2 at 23-157.
Contra, Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New
Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 509, 527-30 (1967).
75 See p. 1482 supra.
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lengthy suits for infringement upon summary judgment when there
had been an initial adjudication of invalidity. However, as mentioned
previously, if there has been no initial adjudication of invalidity there
can be no estoppel, and summary judgment upon motion by the defen-
dant will be unlikely. Collateral estoppel, according to Blonder, cannot
be invoked against a patentee who is able to amass a string of ad-
judications of validity against a series of weak defendants without
receiving a single adjudication of invalidity. But such an approach is
likely to be expensive. In addition, a court may vitiate the effect of prior
judgments of validity once an adjudication of invalidity occurs. Further,
even if a series of separate suits is brought, the court may move to con-
vert them into a class action." Therefore, it is not unlikely that the
patentee will prefer to avoid the time and trouble of multiple litigation
and bring the first suit as a class action.78 Through increased use of the
class action, a multiplicity of suits may be avoided and the complexity
of issues inherent in suits for patent infringement may be simplified.
The favorable impact upon judicial administration will be appreciably
greater than the Court imagined because Blonder makes it likely that
the first patent infringement suit will be brought as, or converted to, a
class action.
Thus, the three policies supporting the Court's decision in Blonder
are reinforced by increased use of Rule 23 in suits for patent infringe-
ment.
V. USE OF THE CLASS ACTION IN SUITS
FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
In light of the foregoing material, the rudiments of the class action
should be analyzed in order to determine the general applicability of
the class action to suits for patent infringement and the impact of
Blonder on the practical aspects of maintaining a suit as a class action.
The class action was originally an equitable tool and has been
historically used by the federal courts to provide "a procedural device
so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals,
united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them
immunity from their equitable wrongs." 79 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure enumerates the factors to be considered by a court in
determining whether to maintain a suit as a class action. 8°
77 See p. 1487 supra.
78 In particular, the patentee who lacks sufficient resources to litigate a multiplicity
of infringement suits against financially powerful opponents in different parts of the
country need not spread his resources, jeopardizing his ability to present a vigorous
defense of his patent. The patentee can litigate by class action, avoiding a multiplicity
of complex and expensive suits and ensuring that a valid patent will not be im-
providently adjudicated invalid due to a dearth of information resulting from an
inability to prosecute his claim.
78 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948). See 3B
Moore 11 23.02(1); 2 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 561
(Wright ed. 1961); Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 192-242 (1950).
88 These factors, of course, are subject to the basic purpose of all the rules, which
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Recently, the class action was utilized in three suits for patent in-
fringement. In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec-
tronics," the patentee filed over seventy suits for patent infringement
in eighteen judicial districts and the Court of Claims. Each defendant
was alleged to have infringed one or more of three patents held by the
plaintiff. The defendants asserted the usual defenses to an infringement
suit: fraud on the Patent Office, invalidity, noninfringement, and
misuse of the patents.' Thirty-five actions were dismissed without
prejudice and could have been reinstated by motion with leave of
court. Twenty-eight cases remained pending in six judicial districts and
the Court of Claims. In addition, plaintiff notified over, two hundred
parties that they had been and were infringing one or more of the three
patents and were liable to the plaintiff for the alleged infringement.
Plaintiff had commenced four suits for patent infringement in the
Northern District of Illinois, but before that court had reached a deci-
sion on the merits, the District Court for the District of Maryland ruled
that certain claims of the three patents were invalid." The finding of
invalidity was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit" and the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment against
the plaintiff on the basis of the Maryland district court's decision. The
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that there was
a genuine issue of material fact concerning validity and held that the
Maryland district court's decision could be adopted by comity only
after hearing testimony at a trial of the case on the merits." On remand,
after the district court had examined the possibility of proceeding under
Rule 23, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaints in
order to maintain the suits as a class action." The cases were found to
be maintainable as a class action with respect to the issues of validity,
misuse, and fraud on the Patent Office."
In Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.," plaintiff
is "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 1. This goal is particularly relevant to patent litigation in which a multiplicity
of actions, lengthy delays, and great expense are not uncommon. See Manual for Com-
plex and Multidistrict Litigation 3-4.
81 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. III. 1968).
82
 For a discussion of patent misuse as a defense see Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse
Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 76 (1962). See also Kennedy, Patent
and Antitrust Policy, The Search For a Unitary Theory, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 512
(1967).
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1,
58 (D. Md. 1963).
84 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 379 U.S. 826 (1964), aff'g per curiam 218
F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1963).
88 Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc. 356 F.2d 442, 447
(7th Cir. 1966). Since the case was decided prior to Blonder the Maryland District
Court's ruling could not be given conclusive effect.
80
 285 F. Supp. at 718.
87 Id. at 725-27.
88
 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Research Corp. v.
Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
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initially brought suit against Pfister for patent infringement and sub-
sequently joined several other defendants. A trial was held on the issue
of patent validity and the issue was taken under advisement. Plaintiff
then filed a class action against defendants not named in the original
suit. The order taking the earlier case under advisement was vacated
and the cases were consolidated for all purposes. Defendants moved to
dismiss the class action allegations in the complaint. The motion was
denied and the suit was found to be maintainable as a class action."
The court, considering in detail the applicability of the class action
procedure to suits for patent infringement, was highly receptive to the
procedure and relied heavily on the Technograph opinion. It will be
noted that both the Technograph and Research opinions were the prod-
ucts of careful scrutiny of the purposes of the class action procedure in
relation to suits for patent infringement.
In Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp." plaintiff brought five
actions for patent infringement and moved for leave to amend the com-
plaints in order to establish a class action. The motion was denied."
Unlike Technograph and Research, the Technitrol opinion scarcely
considered the policies underlying Rule 23 and failed to perceive the
compatibility of the patent infringement suit and the class action pro-
cedure.
Rule 23(a) specifies four necessary conditions for maintaining a
suit as a class action: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties must be typical of those of the other members of the class;
and (4) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class."
The term "impracticable" in the first prerequisite refers to the dif-
ficulty of joining all class members and does not mean "impossible,""
although the size of the class in a suit for patent infringement may in-
deed make joinder "impossible"" due to venue limitations." There is no
absolute numerical test by which joinder can be found impracticable.
Instead, the size of the group required to justify the class action is rela-
tive, depending upon the particular situation." In Research and Tech-
nograph the suits were held to be maintainable as class actions since
89 301 F. Supp. at 504.
90 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970) (oral opinion).
el Id. at 554.
92 Requirements (2) through (4) are clearly interrelated.
ea 3B Moore 1 23.05, at 23-280.
94 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
06
 The special venue statute for suits for patent infringement Is 28 U.S.C. 1400(b)
(1970).
90 3B Moore f 23.05, at 23-277 to 23-278; 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562.4 and 562.4
(Cum. Supp. 1971). In Phillips v. Sherman, 197 F. Supp. 866 (N.D.N.Y. 1961), a group
of 29 plaintiffs was held insufficient to warrant a class action. Id. at 869. Compare
Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsect. Hosp. Ass'n., 375 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967),
where 18 members were allowed to bring a class action. Id. at 653.
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the sheer number of alleged infringers was so great as to thrust a for-
midable burden upon the court beyond the associated limitations of
venue." In Technitrol the plaintiff had sued five alleged infringers and
had identified more than fifty others against whom suit had not yet
been brought. The court, however, questioned whether plaintiff's allega-
tion that there were fifty or more infringers should be allowed to satisfy
the first requirement of Rule 23 (a), and confined its attention to those
parties before it." However, the court took no position as to whether
the class was so numerous as to make joinder impracticable.
The second prerequisite of Rule 23(a) requires that questions of
law or fact be common to the class. In suits for patent infringement it
is likely that each class member will assert the defense of invalidity.
In Research and Technograph the courts found the issue of validity to
be common to the class but considered the issue of infringement to be
distinct and suitable for separate adjudication." The court in Tech-
naval agreed with the Research and Technograph decisions on this
point.'"
The third prerequisite of Rule 23 (a) requires that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties must be "typical" of those of the
class."' The defense of invalidity asserted by the representative parties
was found to pervade the class in Research and Technograph, and
thereby to be "typical" of the class defenses.'" In contrast, Technitrol
stated that the defenses of the class members might be divergent due to
either differences in emphasis, differences in claim coverage, or differ-
ences arising from individual defendants' efforts to invalidate only those
claims which they were alleged to have infringed.'" Consequently, the
defenses of the representative parties could not be "typical" of those
of the class. But if the issue of validity is common to the class, as Tech-
nitrol admits, it is difficult to perceive why the defense of invalidity,
07 The Research class was "at least as large as 400." 301 F. Supp. at 499. In
Technograph, it appeared likely that the number of alleged infringers, some of whom
were unknown, would exceed 240. 285 F. Supp. at 720.
98
 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
99
 The infringement issue in Research did not prevent determination of the issue
of validity in the class action since such determination could dispose of most of the
patent issues. Moreover, most of the named defendants had "almost admitted infringe-
ment" and the industry had been using the patented process in varying degrees since
the issue of the patent, making litigation of the issue of infringement unlikely. 301 F.
Supp. at 499. In Technograph, the issue of infringement was ordered to be the subject
of a separate trial pursuant to Rule 42, and trial was deferred until determination of
the class action on the merits. 285 F. Supp. at 720.
100 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
101 See 311 Moore 23.06-2; 2 Barron & Holtzoff 562 at 64 n.3 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
102 Although in Research, the defense of noninfringement was considered peculiar
to each member of the class, it was not found to affect the "typical" nature of the
defenses of the representative parties. 301 F. Supp, at 499. In Technograph, the defenses
which had been actually raised by the representative parties were found to be typical
of the defenses "reasonably expected to be raised" by the class members. 285 F. Supp. at
721.
108 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
1491
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
when asserted by the representative parties, is not "typical" of the de-
fense asserted by the representative class members.'"
The fourth requirement under Rule 23 (a)—that of adequate rep-
resentation"5—must be carefully scrutinized where the suit has been
brought against a defendant class, in order to preclude the selection of
representatives whose defenses are likely to be ineffectual. The number
of representatives is not a determinative factor since a single represen-
tative of financial ability might represent the class more effectively
than a great number of financially weak representatives.'" Sheer quan-
tity of representatives may not ensure the requisite quality of represen-
tation.'" Although the individual named to represent the class must
be a member of the class 1" and his interests should not conflict
with those of the class, there need not be agreement as to each detail of
the litigation."' In Research the court stated that the "desire" of the
named representatives not to represent the class should be given no
more than "token weight" in light of evidence supporting their "ability
and intention" to litigate the issues common to the class.1" The
Technograph decision emphasized the interests of the named represen-
tatives in the outcome of the controversy, the ability of counsel, and
the "means, skill and integrity necessary to protect fairly and ad-
equately the interests of the class . . . ." 111
 The court in Technitrol
concluded that there might be inconsistencies in representation since
fundamentally the duty of the representative counsel is to win the
case for his own client 1 12 This obligation might require concession
of one line of defense in order to strengthen another, which, although
beneficial to the client of the representative counsel, might be det-
rimental to the nonrepresentative members of the class. However, it is
submitted that the court should direct its attention to the probability,
the scope and the degree of such inconsistencies rather than the mere
possibility of conflict. In assessing these factors, the court should con-
sider the interest of the representative in the outcome of the litigation
and the ability and integrity of the representative to litigate the issues.
104 The requirement of typical defenses may be equated to the requirement of
common questions. Thus, a finding that Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied may support a similar
finding with respect to Rule 23(a) (3). 3B Moore II 23.06-2, at 23-325 to 23-326.
1° 5 See 3B Moore II 23.07(1); 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 567, at ill n.4.2 (Cum. Supp.
1971).
100 3B Moore Q 23.07(4); 2 Barron & Holtzoff 567 at 102 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
107 It has been said that, "[T]he primary criterion is the forthrightness and vigor
with which the representative party can be expected to assert and defend the interests
of the members of the class, so as to insure them due process." Mersay v. First Republic
Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
108 3B Moore fl 23.04 at 23-254; 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 567, at 107 n.99.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
100 3B Moore ii 23.07(3); 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 567, at 109 n.l. (Cum. Supp. 1971).
110
 301 F. Supp. at 499.
111 285 F. Supp. at 721. Furthermore, "[t]he cost of the legal representation and of
expenses seems to be a proper consideration in determining the identity of the representa-
tive parties for the class. . . ." Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation at 20.
112 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
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The court's argument in Technitrol may be employed to render Rule 23
useless since this argument pertains to any defendant-class action.
Obviously, some discord can be tolerated without sacrificing adequate
protection of the class' interests.
If any of the first three requirements of Rule 23 is not met, the
court must find the suit not maintainable as a class action, although the
suit may be continued individually if federal jurisdictional require-
ments are satisfied.'" On the other hand, meeting the requirements of
the four prerequisites is not alone sufficient to maintain the suit as a
class action. In addition, at least one of the three sections of Rule 23 (b)
must be satisfied.' The three categories outlined in Rule 23 (b) are
not mutually exclusive and overlap is not uncommon.'"
Rule 23 (b) (1) permits the class action in situations where other-
wise there may be adverse effects on opponents to the class or non-
representative members of the class.'" Specifically, Rule 23 (b) (1) (A)
concerns separate actions against class members which would create a
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in incompatible
standards of conduct for the class opponent. In Research, the court con-
cluded that separate actions would present the risk that an adjudication
of validity in one case could be matched by one of invalidity in another
case, thus establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the
patentee who could enforce the patent against some infringers but not
others.'" The Technograph court stated that this argument applied to
adjudications on the common questions of fraud on the Patent Office
and misuse of the patent as well as validity.'" In contrast, the Techni-
trol court stated that although the patent might be adjudicated invalid
in one jurisdiction and valid in another, the effect would not be to im-
pose inconsistent duties upon the patent holder.'" The effect would be
merely to produce different results based on a single standard—
recovery where the law permits and no recovery where it does not.'
This argument may be applicable when federal courts apply potentially
divergent state law, but when federal courts apply a single federal
statute to ostensibly the same facts the outcome should be predictable
and the decisions uniform. 12"
115 2 Barron & Holtzoff { 562, at 64-65 (Cum. Supp. 1971). If, however, the
prerequisite of adequate representation of the class is not met the court may provide an
opportunity to bring in additional members of the class in order to satisfy this require-
ment. Id. at 65.
114 311 Moore § 23.31(1), at 23-525; 2 Barron & Holtzoff { 562, at 65 (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
115 3B Moore 11 2331(2). In Technograph the suit was found to satisfy all three
provisions of Rule 23(b). 285 F. Supp. at 721.
110 311 Moore § 23.35(1); 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562 at 66 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (A) deals with the adverse effect upon the party opposing the
class while Fed. R. Civ. P, 23(b)(1)(B) relates to the adverse effect upon class members.
117
 301 F. Supp. at 499.
118 285 F. Supp. at 722.
110	 usy.Q. at 553.2
 Id.
121 E.g., Report of the President's Comm'n on the Patent System at 38-39 (1966).
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The risk of inconsistent adjudications described in Rule 23 (b) (1)
(A) is diminished by Blonder to the extent that a finding of invalidity
may now be given conclusive effect in subsequent litigation. That is,
the decision in Blonder ensures uniformity of decision where there has
been an initial adjudication of invalidity. However, the risk that a
finding of validity may be followed by a conflicting adjudication of
invalidity is unaffected by the decision in Blonder, since the Court care-
fully restricted its holding to prior adjudications of invalidity. To that
extent, the risk of inconsistent adjudications of the issue of validity
persists and the holding in Blonder should not adversely affect the
maintainability of a class action under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A)..
The corollary to clause (b) (1) (A) is (b) (1) (B), which permits
the class action if individual adjudications would, as a practical mat-
ter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class not
party to those adjudications, or substantially impair or impede these
members' ability to protect their interests. The individual adjudication
referred to need not be legally binding on the absentee members. 122
The Research and Technograph courts concluded that, due to the
inherent complexity of the subject matter in most patent cases, in-
dividual adjudications of the issues of patent validity, fraud on the
Patent Office, and misuse of the patent would receive "great weight"
by comity."3
 In light of the great expense of defending a patent suit,
the ability of the members of the class, not party to the individual suit,
to protect their interests may be substantially impaired or impeded.'"
This is especially true when the class member is a small manufacturer,
financially unable to defend an infringement suit. In addition, settle-
ments in .one district may be contingent upon decision in another dis-
trict, so that a decision may be clearly dispositive of the interests of
class members in other judicial districts.
Nevertheless, the court in Technitrol held that a decision of valid-
ity in one district does not prevent an alleged infringer from defending
in another district, or even the same district under certain circum-
stances, because each member of the class retains the unimpaired right
to challenge the validity of the patent when sued separately.'" The
Technitrol court appears to have misconstrued Rule 23 (b) (1) (B),
for it is the ability of the class members to protect their interests and
not their right to do so which is the matter for consideration under the
rule."B Although a defendant retains the unimpaired right to defend in
another district, his ability to do so successfully may be substantially
impeded by way of comity when there has been a prior adjudication of
validity. Moreover, since a finding of invalidity is now given conclusive
122 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562, at 67 (Cum. Supp. 1971 ).
123 301 F. Supp. at 500; 285 F. Supp. at 723.
124 285 F. Supp. at 723.
125 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
126 See, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 100-01 (1966) (Advisory Comm. Notes).
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effect in subsequent suits brought by the patentee, a separate adjudica-
tion may clearly be dispositive of the interests of the class members.
A class suit may also be maintained under the provisions of Rule
23 (b) (2). Rule 23 (b) (2) permits the class action when the opponent
of the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, making final injunctive relief or "corresponding" declara.
tory relief appropriate with respect to the class.'" Declaratory relief
"corresponds" to injunctive relief when, as a practical matter, it affords
injuctive relief or serves as a basis for subsequent injunctive relief. 128
The chief limitation on the applicability of the subsection is that it does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate relief is exclusively or
predominantly monetary 129
The Research and Technograph decisions indicate that by obtain=
ing patents, by notifying alleged infringers of the patents, by threaten-
ing other alleged infringers with suits for infringement unless licenses
are taken, and by bringing actions for infringement against others, a
plaintiff-patentee acts on grounds generally applicable to the class.'"
Moreover, where plaintiff prays for injunctive relief and each defendant
counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief," 1 final injunctive
and declaratory relief is appropriate.'" Even in the absence of counter-
claims, final injunctive relief would be proper regardless of the validity
of the patent for two reasons. First, plaintiff requesta injunctive relief
should the patent be adjudicated valid. Secondly, defendant would cer-
tainly request injunctive relief should the patent be adjudicated in-
valid.'" Neither in Research nor Technograph did the request for
damages prevent the court from maintaining the suit as a class action
under Federal Rule 23 (b) (2)." 4 However, in Technitrol the court
indicated that the (b) (2) action would be inappropriate where any
127 Id. at 102. The Advisory Committee's Note gives several examples of the
Rule 23(b) (2) action in the civil rights field but, adds that the subsection "is not limIttid
to civil-rights cases." Id. See 38 Moore fr 23.40, at 23-653; 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562,
at 69 (Ctim. Supp. 1971).
128 38 Moore fr 23.40, at 23-654.
120 3B Moore § 23.40, at 23-654; 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562, at 69-70 (Cum. Supp.
1971), In patent suits injunctive relief is not an inconsequential element, but rather, is
expressly guaranteed to the patentee. 35 U.S.C. H 154, 283 (1970). See Note, Injunctive
Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U, Pa. L. Rev. 1025 (1964). .
18° 301 F. Supp. at 500; 285 F. Supp. at 723.
181 A defendant in a patent infringement suit is entitled to file a counter-Claim for
declaratory judgment on the issue of validity, since otherwise the federal district Court
could dispose of the infringement suit on the grounds of noninfringement without
reaching the issue of validity. Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp.
373, 374 (E,D. Wise. 1969). The interest of the public in the validity of a patent requires
that, wherever possible and practical, the court determine the validity of all claims. Id.
182 301 F. Supp. at 500; 285 F. Supp. at 723.
188 301 F. Supp. at 500. The res judicata effect of a prior judgment may be en-
forced by injunction when the applicant can show the "[v]exatious, damaging, or
harassing potentialities of the proceeding to be enjoined. . . ." 18 Moore § 0.408(2), at
957.
184 301 F. Supp. at 500; 285 F. Supp. at 723.
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monetary relief is sought.'" According to Technitrol, the (b) (2) action
is strictly limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. Rule 23 (b) (2) , was
not 'intended to apply where the appropriate final relief is exclusively
or, predominately monetary. However, where the primary relief is in-
junctive, the (b) (2) action should be maintained despite the fact that
monetary relief is also sought.'"
The third method of maintaining a suit as a class action is
described in Rule 23 (b) (3). The objectives of the (b) (3) action are
to achieve "economies of judicial time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacri-
ficing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable re-
sults. ' 87 Rule 23 (b) (3) permits maintenance of a class action where
the only justification is the' presence of common questions of law or
fa.ct.198
 However, the common questions must predominate over ques-
tions affecting Only individual members of the class and the class
action must be superior to other methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 189 This subsection enumerates • four
factors'" which the court should consider in deciding whether the
suit is maintainable as a (b) (3) action. However, these factors are
not intended to comprise an exhaustive list, and any other factors
bearing on the predominance of the common questions or the su-
periority of the class action procedure should also be considered."'
In Technograph, after careful examination of these factors, the
court found that the question of patent validity predominated over
those questions which only affected individual members of the class.
Since the benefits to the class and the salutary effect on judicial ad-
ministration derived from the class action procedure far outweighed
any difficulties which might confront the court in managing the class
suit, the suit was found to be maintainable under subsection (b) (3). 142
In contrast, Technitrol flatly stated that the question of validity,
although common to the class, did not predominate and that the class
action was not superior to other methods for adjudicating the con-
195 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553.
188 E.g., Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 295 (ND. Ill. 1970).
137 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. District Courts,
39 F.R.D. 73, 102-03 (1966) (Advisory Comm. Note). This statement should apply to
class actions in general' under Rule 23; and accurately describes the third policy that
motivated the Blonder Court to modify the Triplett rule.
198 2 Barron & Holtzoff 4 562, at 70 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
189 3B Moore Q 23.45(1), at 23-702 to 23-703; 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 562, at 71-72
(Cum. Supp. 1971).
140 These factors are: "(A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution of separate action; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims - in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
141 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. District Courts,
39 F.R.D. 73, 103-04 (1966).
142 285 F. Supp. at 724-25. Compare Research, 301 F. Supp. at 502.
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troversy.'" Given an adjudication of validity in a class action, the
issue of infringement would remain for individual judicial determi-
nation. Since the issue of infringement may involve consideration of
the same factors involved in the issue of validity, the court concluded
that no significant benefit to judicial administration would be derived
from maintaining the suit as a class action.'" However, if the class
suit results in an adjudication of invalidity there will be no necessity
for deciding the issue of infringement. Furthermore, in the event of an
adjudication of validity, infringement may be conceded by the de-
fendants.'48 Finally, the court ignored the prescription that inquiry
be made of the factors enumerated in Rule 23(b) (3) before deciding
whether to maintain a suit under clause (b) (3).
Although an action may be maintainable under any of the three
subsections of Rule 23 (b), the court should not maintain the suit as a
(b) (1) or (b) (2) action with respect to members of the class who
are parties to pending litigation involving questions common to the
class. Such class members possess special interests requiring that they
be permitted the option to proceed with their individual suits. The
class may be divided into (b) (1), (b) (2) and (b) (.3) subclasses in
order to accommodate these class members."° The (b) (3) procedure
affords a mechanism by which such class members may exclude them-
selves from the subclass without subverting the (b)(1) or (b) (2)
subcIasses. 147 Accordingly, the court in Technograph divided the
primary class into six subclasses. The first three subclasses were formed
independently and jointly as (b) (1) and (b) (2) classes and consisted
of defendants who were not parties to pending litigation involving
issues common to the class. The last three subclasses were formed as
(b) (3) classes and corresponded to the same issues as the first three,
but consisted of class members who were parties to pending litigation
which involved the common issues.'" Division into sets of three sub-
classes permitted the (b) (3) members to exclude themselves without
undermining the (b) (1) or (b) (2) subclasses.
The Technitrol court frowned upon a (b) (3) class member having
an absolute right to be excluded from the class upon request'" Un-
checked exercise of the right of exclusion might undermine the utility
of the (b) (3) procedure in suits for patent infringement. The non-
representative class member may prefer to exclude himself from the
148 164	 at 553.
144 Id. at 553-54. But see note 70 supra.
145 See note 99 supra.
140 Should such subdivision occur, each subclass would be treated as a class for
purposes of the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4).
147 3B Moore 4 23.31(1). The right of the (b)(3) class member to exclude himself
upon
	
8request stems from Rule 23(c) (2). See pp. 1498-99 infra.
148	 F. Supp. at 725-27.
140 164 U.S.P.Q. at 553. In contrast, a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class member may only
be excluded at the discretion of the court. Compare 3B Moore IC 23.45(1) at 23-705 with
3B Moore if 23.60 at 23-1202.
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class in order to avoid the binding effect of an adjudication of validity.
In the event of an adjudication of validity the patentee must still bear
the burden of bringing separate suit against the alleged infringer, a
factor which could provide the defendant with a favorable opportunity
for settlement. Thus, due to the diminished size of the class, the (b) (3)
procedure may no longer be superior to other methods of adjudica-
tion.'" For this reason, the Technitrol court concluded that little or
nothing could be gained by utilization of the (b) (3) procedure.'"
However, if the courts rely on the preceding argument to justify denial
of the (b) (3) procedure, Rule 23 (b) (3) becomes hollow in light of
Rule 23(c) (2), which confers the right of exclusion on the (b) (3)
class member. Although the (b) (3) class member retains the right to
exclude himself from the class, he may choose not to exercise that right.
Furthermore, 'a court is not compelled to adhere to an initial determi-
nation of maintainability of a class suit under subsection (b) (3). The
court reserves the power to amend such order when and if necessary.'"
Therefore, assuming the action maintainable only under subsection
(b) (3), the court should provisionally maintain the action under that
subsection. If wholesale exclusions are sought so as to render the (b) (3)
action undesirable, the class action may then be terminated and split
into separate suits. Thus the continuing vitality of the (b) (3) proce-
dure may be ensured while the courts may determine its applicability
on an ad hoc basis.
In general, where the court determines that a suit may be main-
tained as any one of the three actions under subsection (b), it should
maintain the suit as a (b) (1) or (b) (2) action. Thus, exclusion of
(b) (3) class members would not subvert the (b) (1) or (b) (2) pro-
cedures.'" This was the course followed by the court in Research.
The court declined to discuss the possibility of maintaining the suit
under subsection (b) (3) after deciding that it could be maintained
under subsections (b) (1) or (b) (2 ).'" However, as mentioned pre-
viously, where it is equitable to exclude certain members of the class
the court should divide the primary class into subclasses corresponding
to subsections (b) (1) or (b) (2) and (b) (3). The (b) (3) subclass
should contain those class members for whom exclusion is justified. The
result is equitable to both subclasses because the (b) (3) member can
be excluded from his subclass without affecting the (b) (1) or (b) (2)
subclasses.
Assuming, however, that the suit must be maintained under sub-
section (b) (3), unchecked exclusion may subvert the (b) (3) proce-
dure, hence the class action itself. A class member may chooSe to
exclude himself from the class in order to avoid the binding effect of an
adverse adjudication. The excluded class member may then employ
150 3B Moore ¶ 23.45(1) at 23-705 n.24.
151 164 1.7.S.P.Q. at 553.
752 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(5)(1). See 3B Moore Q 23.50 at 23-1103 to 23-1104.
158 3B Moore 1 23.31(3); 2 Barron & 1-lolteoff 562 at 76 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
154 301 F. Supp. at 500.
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dilatory tactics in pending litigation and, upon an adjudication of in-
validity in the class action, plead collateral estoppel. Prior to Blonder,
the excluded defendant could rely on the weight afforded the prior
determination by comity. Now the defendant finds it more attractive
to exclude himself from the class because he can rely on the preclusive
effect of the prior adjudication by virtue of collateral estoppel rather
than merely its persuasive effect by comity.
it is unfair to permit the defendant the privilege of "fence sitting"
whereby he may avoid the cost of the initial determination of invalidity
yet reap its benefits. In seeking to prevent such inequitable conduct,
the courts are faced with a two-fold problem. First, if exclusion is
permitted in the class action, the action may no longer be maintainable
under subsection (b) (3). Secondly, if the action results in an ad-
judication of invalidity, a subsequent court must deal with the antici-
pated plea of estoppel.
Although in these circumstances it may be preferable to condition
exclusion upon a showing of good cause, the right to be excluded from
the (b) (3) action is clearly absolute.'" Permitting the plea of collateral
estoppel, subsequent to exclusion, could encourage exclusion and the
subversion of the (b) (3) procedure. Therefore, the procedural policies
supporting the class action should override the inflexible application
of collateral estoppel.'" The inconvenience to the excluded defendant of
relitigating the issue of validity is far outweighed by the benefits to be
derived from a workable (b) (3) procedure.'"
A solution which may ensure the continuing vitality of the (b) (3)
procedure is to condition the plea of estoppel upon a showing that the
right to exclusion had been exercised for good cause. Where the ex-
clusion was requested merely to avoid the consequences of an adverse
adjudication, the plea of estoppel would be foreclosed. Further, this
restrictive application of collateral estoppel may be justified because a
workable class action procedure has been shown to reinforce those
policies of the patent system and antitrust laws which support the
Blonder decision.'"
Another problem faced by the Technograph and Research courts,
155 It would take a major contrivance to circumvent the language of the rule.
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
39 F.R.D. 73, 104-05 (1966) (Advisory Comm. Note).
[T]he interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations may be so
strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether. Even when a class
action is maintained under subdivision (b) (3), this individual interest is
respected. Thus, the court is required to direct notice to the members of the
class of the right of each member to be excluded from the class upon his
request.
Id.
156 where the application of collateral estoppel would violate an overriding public
policy or cause manifest injustice to a party it should not be applied. 113 Moore
0.405(11), at 783.
157
 See p. 1496 supra.
155 See pp. 1486-88 supra.
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but glossed over by the court in Technitral, was the suitability of the
class suit for patent infringement in light of limitations of venue.'"
Federal Rule 82 states that the rules must not be construed to
"extend or limit" the jurisdiction of the federal courts "or the venue of
actions therein." Rule 23 is silent on this matter. In order to harmonize
the federal jurisdictional requirements with the policy of the rules
relating to additional parties, the federal courts have employed the
concept of "ancillary jurisdiction."'" The concept may be used to
permit intervention of class members without defeating diversity re-
quirements on the grounds that the claims or defenses of the class
representatives are sufficiently related to those of the members of the
class."' The concept is consistent with the rule that, in a class action,
only the Citizenship of the named representatives should be considered
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.'" Although the question of
diversity is not involved in suits for patent infringement,'" consider-
ations of procedural convenience and economy which underlie the ,
concept of ancillary jurisdiction justify treatment of the residence
of nonrepresentative class members as ancillary to the residence of the
named representatives for purposes of venue.'" Therefore, only the
residence of the named representatives should be considered for pur-
poses of venue.'"
The special venue statute for patent infringement suits has been
construed by the Supreme Court to require satisfaction as to all de-
fendants joined in an action.'" Therefore, in Research, the defendants
argued that all class members must satisfy the requirements of the
patent venue statute for, if they did not, and the class action were
permitted, the venue of the action would be "extended" contrary to
Rule 82.107 The court disagreed, holding that the special venue statute
does not apply to nonrepresentative class members. To require satis-
faction of the special venue statute by nonrepresentative class members
159 Venue is limited in suits for patent infringement by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The
general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), does not apply to suits for patent infringe-
ment. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
165 E.g., Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (ND. Iowa 1959). The concept of
"ancillary jurisdiction" enables a district court to acquire jurisdiction of an entire case
or controversy. That Ls, if the court has jurisdiction over the principal action it may
also acquire jurisdiction over any ancillary proceedings, regardless of the citizenship of
the parties, the amount in controversy, or any other factors that might ordinarily
preclude jurisdiction. 1 Barron & Holtzoff § 23, at '93 (Wright ed. 1960). The concept
is necessary 'for the court to fairly and'effectively determine the principal action. Id. at
94. Furthermore, it is in harmony with the purposes of Rule 23, promoting procedural
convenience and economy. 2 Barron & Holtzoff § 569, at 115 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
101 2 Barron & Holtzoff 1 569, at 115 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
162 Id. at 114-15.
163 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970) bestows exclusive jurisdiction of patent cases upon
the federal courts.
104 '2 Barron & Holtzoff f 569, at 115 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
lea Id.
100 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-229 (1957).
167 301 F. Supp. at 501.
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"would eliminate the use of the class action route in all cases where a
defendant class is appropriate."'"
On the other hand, in Technitrol the court concluded that Rule 23
was not intended to circumvent the specific provisions of the patent
venue statute.'" The Technitrol viewpoint surely renders Rule 23 un-
workable in patent infringement suits since the residence of all class
members, some of them unknown, would have to be considered. The
court simply failed to consider the procedural convenience and judicial
economy which may be accomplished under Rule 23, preferring wooden
application of the patent venue statute. •
A significant benefit of the class action procedure is that the court
actively controls the conduct of the suit. 17° For example, Rule 23 (d)
confers upon the court the power to make appropriate orders to
guarantee the full and fair disclosure of evidence, the power to require
notice of any step for the fair conduct of the action, and the broad
power to deal with "similar procedural matters."
in addition, Rule 23 (e) states that a class action "shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court" and that
"notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given" to all
class members. An illustration of the use of Rule 23 (e) is given in
Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co."' A nonrepresentative member
appealed from a consent judgment entered for the patentee, the class
opponent. The court held that the nonrepresentative member was bound
by the judgment and had no right to appeal. 72
 The class member had
received notice that the suit was being maintained as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 (c), and notice of a proposed settlement pursuant to
Rule 23 (e). However, he neither requested exclusion from the class,
moved to intervene, nor objected to the consent judgment prior to its
approval by the court. The court stated that had the member inter-
vened or even appeared to object to the proposed dismissal or com-
promise, his right to appeal from an adverse final judgment would have
been preserved.'78
A final issue presented by the class action procedure is the scope
and definition of the class. The judgment in a class action binds all
members of the class except those excluded in a (b) (3) action 174
Blonder has an appreciable impact upon the scope of the judgment
in a class action. Prior to Blonder, the patentee who received an ad-
judication of invalidity in a class action would have been free to
relitigate the issue against a stranger to the class. Now the class judg-
108 Id.
169 164 U.S.P.Q. at 552.
170 E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
171 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
172 Id. at 1060.
173
 Id.
174 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). See 2 Barron & Holtzoff 572 at 126 (Cum. Supp.
1971). The class should not include individuals already bound by res judicata to an
adjudication of the common issues. See 285 F. Supp. at 725.
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ment may collaterally estop the patentee from relitigating the issue
of validity against a stranger to the class. Therefore, Blonder broadens
the scope of the judgment in a class suit for patent infringement.
To recapitulate, the court in Technitrol was hostile and superficial
in its treatment of Rule 23 in suits for patent infringement. On the
other hand y
 upon detailed examination of all the circumstances, the
Technograph and Research decisions considered the class action to be
especially suited for use in patent infringement cases. Patent issues are
often complex and litigation frequently involves many judicial districts.
The patent suit may present a considerable burden for the courts, and
innovative procedures that permit effective judicial administration of
such suits should be encouraged. The class action is a procedural device
permitting the just and efficient determination of controversies and
should be employed in the spirit of the Federal Rules to accomplish
judicial economies without sacrificing substantial justice.
CONCLUSION
The Triplett rule was a prohibition without reason. It has been
said of such prohibitions that:
A prohibition, the reason for which we do not understand or
admit, is almost a command not only for the stubborn but also
for those who thirst for knowledge: one risks an experiment
to find out why the prohibition was pronounced.'"
The decision in Blonder was more than an "experiment to find out
why" the rule in Triplett was fashioned.
By abrogating the prohibition in Triplett against affording pre-
clusive effect to adjudications of invalidity, Blonder substantially
reduces the likelihood that a specious patent may be wielded by a
patentee to obstruct those policies relevant to the patent system and
to the public policy of free competition.
The decision also has a favorable impact upon the judicial adminis-
tration of suits for patent infringement. In particular, Blonder pre-
cludes wasteful relitigation of the issue of patent validity. More signi-
ficantly, the decision encourages use of the class action, permitting dis-
position of complex and multidistrict litigation in an efficient and just
manner. Moreover, increased use of the class action in suits for patent
infringement will have the reciprocal effect of promoting those policies
lying at the heart of the decision in Blonder. Rule 23 fosters the free
public use of ideas belonging in the public domain by facilitating the
prudent elimination of specious patents, discourages coercion of
licensing agreements or settlements from weak defendants based on
invalid patents, and reduces the administrative burden upon the federal
courts. For these reasons, the courts shbuld vigorously encourage
conversion of suits for patent infringement to class actions wherever
appropriate.
MICHAEL P. ABBOTT
175 W. Kaufman; The Portable Nietzche 68 (1954).
1502
